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Resurrecting California's Old Law on
Character Evidence
Edward J. Imwinkelried* and
Miguel A. M6ndez**
INTRODUCTION
One of the cardinal differences between accusatorial and
inquisitorial systems of criminal justice is that in the former, the
prosecution may not use evidence of the accused's character to
prove that the accused committed a specific antisocial act.1
Accusatorial systems hold individuals criminally responsible only
"for what they do and not for what they are. ' 2 In contrast,
inquisitorial systems permit "trial by dossier ' 3 and routinely
admit evidence of all of the accused's past misdeeds.4
It is an axiom of American penal law that the accused need
answer only for the crime with which he is currently charged.5 The
Supreme Court has elevated this principle to constitutional status
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1. D. ELLOTT, PHIPSON AND ELuoTr MANUAL OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 202 (11th ed.
1980); A. ZuCKERMAN, THE PiNCiPLEs OF CRIMINAL EViDENCE 232 (1989) (stating that this is
..one of the most deeply rooted and jealously guarded principles of our criminal law").
2. H. PACKER, THE LIMrrs OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 73-74 (1968).
3. Bemyk v. State, 182 Ga. App. 329, 332, 355 S.E.2d 753, 755 (1987) (Beasley, I.,
concurring).
4. Orfield, Relevancy in Criminal Evidence, 43 Na. L. REV. 485, 519 (1963).
5. Comment, State v. Ellis: The Other Wrongful Acts Rule, Survey of Nebraska Law-
Evidence, 15 CREIGHTON L REV. 281, 284 (1981).
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by announcing that the Eighth Amendment's prohibition of cruel
and unusual punishment precludes legislatures and courts from
criminalizing a person's status. 6 American rules of evidence
reinforce this principle of substantive criminal law. With the
possible exception of California, all American jurisdictions, either
by statute or case law, enforce a version of the common law rule
prohibiting the prosecution from using the accused's character as
evidence that the accused committed the offense charged.7
Typical of the general approach in the United States is Federal
Rule of Evidence section 404(a), which prohibits the prosecution
from using evidence of the accused's prior offenses to establish the
accused's bad character and, in turn, employing the accused's bad
character to prove the accused committed the crime charged.'
California Evidence Code section 1101(a) is to the same effect.'
Both the Federal Rules of Evidence and the California Evidence
Code reflect a firm,'" longstanding," and "decidedly
unfriendly" attitude toward evidence about the accused's bad
chiaracter" by imposing severe limitations on the prosecution's
use of such evidence.
13
It is one matter for the criminal law to forbid punishing a
person for his status--say, that of being an addict. It is quite
another for the law of evidence to reinforce this principle by
declaring inadmissible, for instance, evidence of the accused's
addiction, when offered to prove that the accused committed a
specific, punishable act such as being under the influence. Dean
McCormick cited several reasons for excluding such
unquestionably relevant evidence when offered, not to prove the
6. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 666 (1962).
7. C. McCoRuicK, EViDENCE § 190 (3d ed. 1984).
8. FED. T. EVWD. § 404(a).
9. See CAL. EviD. CODE § 1101 (West Supp. 1991) (prohibiting the prosecution from using
evideance of the accused's prior offenses to establish bad character).
10. Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 475-76 (1948).
11. See Uviller, Evidence of Character to Prove Conduct: Illusion, Illogic, and Injustice in
the Courtroom, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 845, 850 n.14 (1982).
12. ld. at 851.
13. M6ndez, California's New Law on Character Evidence: Evidence Code Section 352 and
the Impact of Recent Psychological Studies, 31 UCLA L REv. 1003, 1006, 1042 (1984) [hereinafter
Mdndez].
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accused's status, but to prove the accused's commission of a
punishable act.
McCormick believed that the prosecution's evidence might
unduly arouse the jury's hostility and induce it to return a guilty
verdict on an improper basis. 4 Thus, the jurors might convict the
accused based on character (in this case addiction) rather than
convicting the accused because the force of the evidence convinces
them that the accused is guilty of the conduct charged (i.e., being
under the influence on a specified occasion). 5 McCormick also
thought evidence that the accused had committed similar acts on
other occasions would distract the jury from the pivotal issue of
whether the accused committed the specific act with which the
accused was charged. 6 In addition, McCormick felt that the
admission of character evidence, and its counter evidence, would
consume too much time. 17 Finally, since criminal trials are
generally bereft of the formal discovery available in civil
proceedings, McCormick feared that if the accused had no reason
to anticipate the prosecution's character evidence, the accused
would be unfairly surprised and unprepared to meet the
evidence. 18
Wigmore advanced similar reasons for excluding character
evidence when offered to prove that the accused committed the
offense charged. Wigmore believed that jurors would overestimate
the probative value of the evidence: If jurors learned that the
accused had engaged, on other occasions, in the type of conduct for
which the accused was on trial, the jury might jump to the
unwarranted conclusion that the accused must be guilty of the
offense charged. 9 Wigmore was equally concerned that jurors
might apply a theory of culpability based on status rather than on
punishable conduct.2" Having heard evidence of the accused's bad
14. C. McCoRMIC., HANDBOOKO T nLAw oF EVDENCE § 188 (B. Cleary 2d ed. 1972).
15. Id
16. ld at § 185.
17. Id
18. Id
19. 1 J. WIOMORE_, EVDENCE § 194 (3d ed. 1940).
20. Id
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character, jurors might conclude that the accused was a bad person
deserving of punishment and convict the accused accordingly,
irrespective of whether the other evidence convinced them that the
accused was guilty of the specific act charged.21
The concerns expressed by McCormick and Wigmore gave rise
to the common law rule prohibiting the use of character evidence
to prove the accused's guilt. Such a prohibition was included in the
earliest codifications of the law of evidence. 22 It attained statutory
status in California with the adoption of the Evidence Code in
1965, and in the federal courts in 1975 when the Federal Rules
of Evidence were enacted.24
The rule prohibiting use of character evidence to prove an
accused's guilt has been followed in a substantially similar form in
all American jurisdictions. But the rule may no longer be
applicable in California. In June 1982, the California electorate
approved Proposition 8.' Variously referred to as the "Criminal
Justice Initiative," the "Victims' Bill of Rights," and the "Gann
Initiative," Proposition 8 amended the California Constitution by
adding the following language to Article I:
(d) Right to Truth-in-Evidence. Except as provided by statute hereafter
enacted by a two-thirds vote of the membership in each house of the
Legislature, relevant evidence shall not be excluded in any criminal
proceeding ... Nothing in this section shall affect any existing
statutory rule of evidence relating to privilege or hearsay, or Evidence
Code Sections 352, 782, or 1103... 26
The first sentence of section 28(d) purports to vest parties to
California criminal proceedings with a constitutional right to
21. Id
22. See, e.g., MoDEL CODE op EvIENcE RULES 304-06 (1942).
23. See CAL. EvrD. CODE, Foreword III (West 1966).
24. See FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE FOR UNITED STAIE COURTS AND MAoIsTRATES,
Introduction II (West 1987).
25. Victime BillofRights, Initiative Measure Proposition 8 (approved June 8,1982) (codified
at CAL. CONST. art. I, §§ 12, 28; CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 25, 667, 1191.1, 1192.7, 3043 (West Supp.
1992); CAL. WEL. & INST. CODE §§ 1732.5, 1767, 6331 (West Supp. 1992)).
26. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 28(d).
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introduce all relevant evidence.27 If construed literally, this
language would abolish the ancient prohibition on the use of
character evidence.28 Only by virtue of the initiative's second
sentence are the rules relating to hearsay and privileges and the
doctrines codified in California Evidence Code sections 352,29
782,30 and 110331 preserved.
California cases recognizing the interpretive maxim "expressio
unius est exclusio alterius" are legion.32 If a statute or
constitutional provision expressly lists a number of exceptions to
a general rule, the courts ordinarily may not imply other
exceptions.33 Since the statutory character evidence prohibition of
California Evidence Code section 1101 is not expressly exempted
from the operation of Proposition 8, a literal interpretation of the
initiative would overturn the prohibition.34
27. Mdndez, supra note 13, at 1004 n.3. Although the courts have traditionally excluded
evidence of the accused's bad character, they have not done so on the theory that the evidence is
irrelevant. As the United States Supreme Court has observed, "[t]he inquiry is not rejected because
character is irrelevant." Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 475-76 (1948). Rather, the courts
have barred the evidence because of the concerns raised by McCormick and Wigmore. See supra,
notes 14-21 and accompanying text (discussing the views of McCormick and Wigmore).
28. See generally Mdndez, supra note 13.
29. See CAL. EviD. CODE § 352 (West 1966) (authorizing the exclusion of relevant evidence
when "its probative value is substantially outweighed" by such dangers as the risk "of undue
prejudice, of confusing the issues, or of misleading the jury").
30. See id. § 782 (West Supp. 1991) (limiting the use of a rape victim's past sexual conduct
to impeach the credibility of the victim).
31. See k § 1103(b) (West Supp. 1991) (prohibiting the use of a rape victim's past sexual
conduct with others to prove that the victim consented to sexual intercourse with the accused).
32. See, e.g., Pasadena Pohce Officers Ass'n v. City of Pasadena, 51 Cal. 3d 564,576-77,797
P.2d 608, 614-15, 273 Cal. Rptr. 584, 590-91 (1990); Del Mar v. Caspe, 222 Cal. App. 3d 1316,
1330-31, 272 Cal. Rptr. 446, 454 (1990); Parmett v. Superior Court, 212 Cal. App. 3d 1261, 1266,
262 Cal. Rptr. 387, 389 (1989); Salem v. Superior Court, 211 Cal. App. 3d 595, 600, 259 Cal. Rptr.
447, 450 (1989); People v. Melton, 206 Cal. App. 3d 580, 592-93, 253 Cal. Rptr. 661, 669 (1988);
In re Edwayne V., 197 Cal. App. 3d 171, 175, 242 Cal. Rptr. 748, 750-51 (1987); Phillips v. San
Luis Obispo County Dept. of Animal Reg., 183 Cal. App. 3d 372, 379-80,228 Cal. Rptr. 101, 105-
06 (1986); Elysian Heights Residents Ass'n., Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 182 Cal. App. 3d 21, 30,
227 Cal. Rptr. 226, 231 (1986).
33. Del Mar v. Caspe, 222 Cal. App. 3d at 1330-31, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 454.
34. Mdndez, supra note 13, at 1012-13.
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Several commentators,35 including Attorney General Van de
Kamp,36 forecast that the passage of Proposition 8 would repeal
the ban on character evidence in California criminal cases.37
Writing in 1984, one of the authors of this article, Professor
M~ndez, expressed his belief that the adoption of Proposition 8
would lead to a "new law on character evidence" 38 in California:
"the almost total abolition of the common law rules of character
evidence and the replacement of those rules with a grant of broad
judicial discretion to admit... character evidence." 39
In 1982, Professor M6ndez' colleague, the late Professor John
Kaplan of Stanford Law School, prophesied that it would require
"at least 10 years" to determine the real impact Proposition 8
would have on California's criminal evidence law.4" Professor
Kaplan was right. This Article is being published in 1992, a full
decade after the adoption of Proposition 8, and it is still unsettled
whether the character evidence prohibition applies to criminal
prosecutions in California. The Supreme Court of California has
not answered the question explicitly,4 and the lower courts are
divided over the issue.42
35: See, e.g., Uelmen, Proposition 8 Casts Uncertainty Over Vast Areas of Criminal Law,
CAL. LAW., July-Aug. 1982, at 43, 45.
36. Taylor, Experts Differ in Assessing Impact of Gann Initiative, CAL. LAW., July-Aug. 1982,
at 46.
37. Id.
38. Mdndez, supra note 13, at 1003.
39. I&
40. Taylor, supra note 36, at 46.
41. See People v. Sully, 53 Cal. 3d 1195, 1226, 812 P.2d 163, 181, 283 Cal. Rptr. 144, 162
(1991) (indicating that the court did not need to resolve the question whether the "Right To Truth-In-
Evidence" provision effectually repeals Evidence Code section 1101); People v. Harris, 47 Cal. 3d
1047,1081,767 P.2d 619,640,255 Cal. Rptr. 352,373 (1989) (providing that whether section 28(d)
overrules Evidence Code section 1101 was not a question presented in the case); E. ImwoRmu ,
P. WYDICK & J. HOG^, CALIFORN A EVIDENIATARY FOUNDATIONS 17 (Supp. 1990).
42. See E. IMWINKELRIED, R. WYDICK & I. HoGAN, CALIFORNIA EVDNTMARY FOUNDATIONS
166-67 n.1 (1988) (citing People v. Scott, 194 Cal. App. 3d 550,239 Cal. Rptr. 588 (1987); People
v. Taylor, 180 Cal. App. 3d 622, 632, 225 Cal. Rptr. 733, 738 (1986); Newman v. Superior Court,
179 Cal. App. 3d 377,224 Cal. Rptr. 538 (1986); People v. Perkins, 159 Cal. App. 3d 646,205 Cal,
Rptr. 625 (1984)).
On three occasions the California Court of Appeal has upheld the ban on the use of character
evidence in section 1101, in spite of Proposition 8. See People v. Perkins, 159 Cal. App. 3d 646, 650-
51, 205 Cal. Rptr. 625, 627 (1984) (holding that section 1101 was unaffected by Proposition 8
because section 1103 [allowing the use of character evidence to prove the conduct of crime victims],
1010
1992 / Resurrecting Character Evidence Laws
The question of the admissibility of evidence of the accused's
character may be the most frequently litigated issue in criminal
appeals.43 Errors in the admission of this type of evidence are the
which was expressly exempted from Proposition 8, is an exception to section 1101, and exempting
the exception requires retaining the general provisions of section 1101). Id In the view of the Perkins
court, a literal reading of Proposition 8 would lead to absurd results. Id See also Newman v. Superior
Court, 179 Cal. App. 3d 377, 382, 224 Cal. Rptr. 538, 540 (1986) (concurring with Perkins).
Another court of appeal took a different approach in upholding the ban. See People v. Scott,
194 Cal. App. 3d 550,553-56,239 Cal. Rptr. 588, 589-92 (1987) (construing a 1986 amendment to
section 1101 as satisfying Proposition 8's requirement that CAL. CONST. art. I, section 28 (the Right
to Truth-in-Evidence provision) be amended by a supermajority vote in each house of the legislature).
See also 1986 Cal. Stat. ch. 1432, see. 1, at 5129 (amending CAL. EvrD. CODE § 1101). Though the
1986 amendment to section 1101 was aimed at a provision of section 1101 which governs the
admissibility of evidence offered to prove a proposition other than the accused's propensity to
commit the crime charged, the Scott court held that amending the statute had "the legal effect of
reenacting... the statute as amended, including its unamended portions.*" Scon, 194 Cal. App. 3d
at 553-56, 239 Cal. Rptr. at 589-92.
The legislature approved the 1986 amendment to section 1101 in response to the supreme
court's opinion in People v. TasselU, 36 Cal. 3d 77, 679 P.2d 1, 201 Cal. Rptr. 567 (1984). See Cal.
Stat. Ch. 1432, sec. 2, at 973 (amending CAL. EVID. CODE § 1101). In Tassel, the court found it
unnecessary to decide whether Proposition 8 had repealed section 1101(b). Tassel, 36 Cal. 3d at 82
n.1, 679 P.2d at 3 n.1, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 569 n.l. The legislative history of the 1986 amendment to
section 1101 establishes that in adopting the amendment the legislature intended to benefit
prosecutors. Both the analysis prepared by the consultant to the Assembly Committee on Public
Safety and that drafted by the Senate Committee on Judiciary cited Tassel and indicate that the
purpose of the amendment was to make it easier for prosecutors to disprove dishonest claims by
defendants in rape cases that the defendant believed the victim had consented to intercourse.
AsS EmBLY COMMITTEE ON PuBLIC SAFETY, ANALYSIS OF ASSEMBLY BILL 3597 (1986); SENATE
COMMffTm ON JUDICIARY, ANALYSIS OF AS iBLY BiLL 3597 (1986) (hereinafter COMMITEm,
ANALYSES) (copies on file at Pacific Law Journal). As both analyses indicate, the Attorney General's
Office was the source of the proposal, and the California Public Defenders Association opposed it.
CoMMm-EE ANALYSES, supra. It is ironic that an amendment designed to benefit prosecutors was
construed as having reinstated the character evidence rules.
Yet, the Scott court cannot be faulted for its interpretation. Rather, the interpretive difficulties
can be traced to the confusion sown by Proposition 8. If the Right to Truth-in-Evidence provision
repealed section 1101(a)'s ban on the use of character evidence to prove conduct as of June 1982,
then the 1986 amendment to section 1101 was unnecessary since it amends section 1101(b), a section
presumably also repealed by Proposition 8. Section 1101(b) merely states that evidence offered for
some relevant purpose other than character (such as motive, opportunity, etc.) is admissible. CAL.
EvD. CODE § 1101(b) (West Supp. 1991). If as a result of Proposition 8 character evidence is
admissible in the first place, then section 1101(b) is unnecessary. Thus, by approving the amendment
to section 1101, the legislature assumed the validity of section 1101 inits entirety, and the Scottcourt
bad no choice but to apply rules of statutory construction that in effect reinstated section 1101 in its
entirety. If there is a "Catch 22" somewhere in this confusion, it is one created by the authors of
Proposition 8.
43. 22 C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, FEDERAL PRACtICE AND PROCEDURE: EVIDENCE § 5239
(1978).
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single most common ground for reversal in criminal cases.44 The
Supreme Court of California concedes that, with the exception of
evidence of a confession, testimony about the accused's bad
character is "the most prejudicial evidence imaginable against an
accused."'45 Thus, it is virtually unthinkable that ten years after
the passage of Proposition 8 uncertainty still surrounds the standard
governing the admissibility of such crucial and frequently used
evidence. Such uncertainty over the propriety of using character
evidence in criminal trials is intolerable. Professor M6ndez' earlier
prediction that Proposition 8 would result in a new law on
character evidence46 in California has not come to pass. Rather,
the thesis of this Article is that, surprisingly, the "old law on
character evidence"--the general common law ban on evidence of
an accused's bad character to prove conduct in conformity
therewith--may have survived Proposition 8.' This Article
develops that thesis in four sections. Part I describes the general
approach taken by the Supreme Court of California in construing
Proposition 8 and points out that, on occasion, the court has
refused to construe Proposition 8 literally.48 Part I explores the
ways in which California courts have applied Evidence Code
section 352 in light of Proposition 8, and notes that the Supreme
Court of California has refused to apply section 352 as provided in
Proposition 8." Read literally, section 352 would grant only to
44. Note, Evidence - The Emotional Propensity Exception - State v. Treadaway, 116 Ariz
163, 568 P.2d 1061 (1971), special action from remand sub nom. State v. Corcoran,
- Ariz.., - P.2d - (1978), 1978 ARIZ. ST. L. 153, 156.
45. People v. Smallwood, 42 Cal. 3d 415, 429,722 P.2d 197, 205, 228 Cal. Rptr. 913, 922
(1986).
46. Mndez, supra note 13, at 1003.
47. The focus of Professor M6ndez' earlier article is somewhat broader than the scope of the
present article. In his earlier article, Professor M6ndez discussed both the restrictions on evidence
relevant to the historical merits of the case and the limitations on evidence pertinent to witnesses'
credibility. Mindez, supra note 13. The principal concern of this Article is the former type of
restriction.
48. See infira notes 56-122 and accompanying text.
49. See infra notes 123-152 and accompanying text.
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trial judges the discretion to exclude character evidence.50
However, in a landmark case, People v. Harris,5 the court
continued to treat section 352 as authority for the appellate courts
to enforce an uncodified rule excluding a particular type of relevant
but prejudicial evidence.52 Part LI of this Article explores the
propriety of using California Evidence Code section 352 as a basis
for continuing to enforce the "old" law on character evidence.5
Finally, Part IV concludes that vital policy concerns, as well as
consistency with People v. Harris,54 obligate adherence to the
"old" law on character evidence.55
I. THE SuPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA'S
GENERAL APPROACH To THE
INTERPRETATION OF PROPOSITION 8
A. The Resurrection of the "Plain Meaning" Approach to
Statutory Construction
Like a statute, a constitutional provision such as Proposition 8
must be interpreted. 6 The objective of the interpretive process is
to determine the intent of the electorate which voted the
proposition into law.57 To achieve that objective, the court
construing the proposition may resort to the accepted constructional
techniques, including the maxims of interpretation.5"
50. Mndez, supra note 13, at 1037-38, 1059. See Graham, California's "Restatement" of
Evidence: Some Reflections on Appellate Repair of the Codification Fiasco, 4 LoY. LA.L. REv. 279,
284, 299, 303, 307 (1971) (discussing the argument that section 352 represents a grant of power only
to the trial bench).
51. 47 Cal. 3d 1047, 767 P.2d 619, 255 Cal. Rptr. 352 (1989).
52. Id. at 1094, 767 P.2d at 649, 255 Cal. Rptr. at 382.
53. See infra notes 153-258 and accompanying text.
54. 47 Cal. 3d 1047, 767 P.2d 619, 255 Cal. Rptr. 352 (1989).
55. See infra notes 259-260 and accompanying text.
56. People v. Castro, 38 Cal. 3d 301, 319-20, 696 P.2d 111, 122, 211 Cal. Rptr. 719, 730
(1985) (Grodin, J., concurring and dissenting); id. at 328-29, 696 P.2d at 129,211 Cal. Rptr. at 737
(Bird, CJ., concurring and dissenting).
57. Id. at 312, 696 P.2d at 117, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 725.
58. Id. at 319,696 P.2d at 122,211 Cal. Rptr. at 730 (Grodin, J., concurring and dissenting).
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One of the liveliest modem controversies in judicial circles
concerns the proper approach to problems of interpretation. Until
recently, most jurists followed the "legal process" approach
championed by Professors Hart and Sacks.59 The legal process
scholars viewed each piece of legislation as a rational, purposeful
enactment.' They indulged in the presumption that legislators are
reasonable people pursuing social purposes in good faith.61
Working from that presumption, legal process scholars encouraged
courts to liberally consult extrinsic legislative history material.62
If legislators strive in good faith to achieve rational purposes,
presumably they will generate extrinsic materials that shed valuable
light on the meaning of the statutes they enact. Legal process
scholars contended that ignoring or slighting extrinsic materials
could easily result in frustrating the purpose inspiring a piece of
legislation.
63
The traditional legal process approach to statutory construction
attached little weight to the "plain meaning" suggested by the text
of -the statute. The legal process scholars concurred with the
realists, such as Professor Radin, that statutory language rarely
bears a single, obvious meaning.' Under the conventional legal
process approach, the judge construing a statute may resort to
extrinsic legislative history material even when the language is free
of apparent ambiguities and discloses a plain meaning. 65 The
extrinsic material may even legitimately trump "the seemingly
unmistakable meaning" of the text contained in a statute.
66
59. H. HART & A. SACKS, THE LEAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKINO AND
APPLICATION OF LAW 1144-47 (tentative ed. 1958).
60. W. EsKRIGE & P. FICKEY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGIsLAION: STATUTES AND
THE CREATION OP PUBLIC POLICY 571 (1988).
61. Id. at 575-76.
62. Imwinkelried, Evidence Pedagogy in the Age of Statutes, 41 J. LEoAL EDuc. 227, 229
(1991).
63. Keynote Address by Judge Patricia Wald, U.S. Law Week Constitutional Law Conference
in Washington, D.C. (September 1989), reprinted in 58 U.S.LW. 2200,2208 (U.S. Oct. 10, 1989).
64. Radin, Statutory Interpretation, 43 HARv. L. RE V. 863, 868-69 (1930).
65. See, e.g., Cleary, Preliminary Notes on Reading the Rules of Evidence, 57 NEB. L. REv.
908, 918-19 (1978) (urging application of the conventional approach to the construction of the
Federal Rules of Evidence).
66. Id
1014
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In recent years, the legal process approach to statutory
interpretation has come under fire. Conservative law-and-economics
scholars, such as Justice Scalia and Judge Easterbrook, have
questioned both the traditional understanding of statutes as rational,
purposive enactments and the heavy reliance on extrinsic materials.
These scholars view statutes as expedient compromises.67 To pass
a provision, supporters must strike a deal--that is, reach a
compromise.68 For that reason the statute may lack a single,
consistent purpose.69 Accordingly, only the text itself should have
the force of law.7"
Scholars such as Justice Scalia and Judge Easterbrook are
frankly skeptical of the trustworthiness of extrinsic material
purporting to detail the legislative history of a provision. They
challenge the assumption that extrinsic materials accurately reflect
the purpose which animated the supporters of the provision. Quite
to the contrary, these scholars contend that extrinsic materials are
often the product of deliberate manipulation by special interest
groups or legislators allied with these groups.71 Consequently,
they advocate a "textualist" approach to construction--an approach
that places greater emphasis on the literal meaning of the language
of the provision in question.72 To an important degree, the
textualists have resurrected a "plain meaning" approach to
interpreting constitutional and statutory provisions.73
Although the leading textualists are federal jurists, textualism
is influencing the California courts as well.74 The Supreme Court
67. Eskridge & Frickey, Legislation Scholarship and Pedagogy in the Post-Legal Process Era,
48 U. Prrr. L. REV. 691, 703, 710 (1987).
68. fa at 703-04.
69. R. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM 533, 544-52 (1983).
70. Easterbrook, Statutes' Domain, 50 U. Cm. L. REv. 533, 544-52 (1983).
71. W. ESKRIDGE & P. FRICKEY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND
THE CREATION OF PUBLIC Poucy 715-17 (1988).
72. See generally Eskrlidge, The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L REv. 621 (1990).
73. See, e.g., Jonakait, The Supreme Court Plain Meaning, and the Changed Rules of
Evidence, 68 TEX. L REv. 745 (1990) (discussing United States Supreme Court's imposition of the
plain meaning standard of statutory interpretation on the Federal Rules of Evidence).
74. See, e.g., Kaufman & Broad v. City of Modesto, _ Cal. App. 4th * 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d
28, 33 (1992); Rancho Bernardo v. Superior Court, 2 Cal. App. 4th 358, 362, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 878,
880 (1992); People v. Auer, 1 Cal. App. 4th 1664, 1668-69, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 823, 824-25 (1991);
Bowens v. Superior Court (People), 1 Cal. 4th 36, 48, 820 P.2d 600, 608, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 376, 384
1015
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of California gave the "plain meaning" approach a significant
boost in People v. Harris.7 5 In Harris, the court not only
approved the principle that "[c]onstitutional provisions, like
statutes, must be read in conformity with their plain language,"
76
but also applied the principle to two provisions of Proposition 8.
One provision to which the Harris court applied a "plain
meaning" construction was the Right to Truth-in-Evidence
language embodied in section 28(d). 7 The issue was whether a
prosecutor could use a specific instance of a witness' truthful
behavior as affirmative evidence of the witness' credibility.78
Evidence Code section 787 prohibits the use of such evidence to
support or attack the credibility of a witness.7 9 Section 787,
however, is not one of the provisions exempted from Proposition
8's command that all relevant evidence is admissible.8 0
(1991); State v. Western Natural Rubber, Inc., 235 Cal. App. 3d 1495, 1501, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d 495,498
(1991); Fellowship of Friends, Inc. v. County of Yuba, 235 Cal. App. 3d 1190, 1195, 1 Cal. Rptr.
2d 284, 286-87 (1991); In re David L.,234 Cal. App. 3d 1655,1658,286 Cal. Rptr. 398,400 (1991);
People v. Burroughs, 234 Cal. App. 3d 245,250,285 Cal. Rptr. 622, 625 (1991); City of Victorville
v. County of San Bernardino, 233 Cal. App. 3d 1312, 1318,285 Cal. Rptr. 206, 210 (1991); In re
Reeves, 233 Cal. App. 3d 651, 656, 284 Cal. Rptr. 650, 652 (1991); Haworth v. Lira, 232 Cal. App.
3d 1362,1368 n.1,284 Cal. Rptr. 62,65 n.1, (1991); Lubin v. Wilson, 232 Cal. App. 3d 1422, 1427,
284 Cal. Rptr. 70,72 (1991); Transamerica Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 232
Cal. App. 3d 1048, 1056, 284 Cal. Rptr. 9, 14 (1991); Industrial Risk Insurers v. Rust Eng'g. Co.,
232 Cal. App. 3d 1038, 1042, 283 Cal. Rptr. 873, 874 (1991); Botello v. Shell Oil Co., 229 Cal.
App. 3d 1130, 1135, 280 Cal. Rptr. 535, 537 (1991); California Insurance Guarantee Assoc. v.
Argonaut Ins. Co., 227 Cal. App. 3d 624,633-34,278 Cal. Rptr. 23,28-29 (1991); People v. Owen,
226 Cal. App. 3d 996, 1003, 277 Cal. Rptr. 341, 346 (1991); People v. Bartlett, 226 Cal. App. 3d
244, 249-50, 276 Cal. Rptr. 460, 463 (1990); Crowl v. Comm'n on Professional Competence, 225
Cal. App. 3d 334,343,275 Cal. Rptr. 86,92 (1990); Values v. Santa Monica Rent Control Bd., 221
Cal. App. 3d 1116, 1121, 270 Cal. Rptr. 636, 638 (1990); Schwetz v. Minnerly, 220 Cal. App. 3d
296, 302, 269 Cal. Rptr. 417, 421 (1990); Barrett v. Lipscomb, 194 Cal. App. 3d 1524, 1530, 240
Cal. Rptr. 336, 340 (1987); Palmer v. City of Ojai, 178 Cal. App. 3d 280, 290, 223 Cal. Rptr. 542,
548 (1986) (cases stating that when construing a statute, courts must first look to language of statute;
where language of statute is clear and unambiguous, courts should refrain from engaging in statutory
construction to ascertain legislative intent). But see Clavell v. North Coast Business Park, 232 Cal.
App. 3d 328, 332, 283 Cal. Rptr. 419, 421 (1991) (stating that "whatever criticism there may be of
judicial recourse to legislative intent in construing statutes ... California is firmly committed to the
practice...").
75. 47 Cal. 3d 1047, 767 P.2d 619, 255 Cal. Rptr. 352 (1989).
76. Id at 1082, 767 P.2d at 641, 255 Cal. Rptr. at 374.
77. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 28(d) (West 1983).
78. Harris, 47 Cal. 3d at 1080-83, 767 P.2d at 640-41, 255 Cal. Rptr. at 373-74.
79. CAL. EvID. CODE § 787 (West 1966).
80. See CAL CO NST. art. I, § 28(d) (codifying, in part, Proposition 8).
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Accordingly, the court concluded that the Right to Truth-in-
Evidence provision effected "a pro tanto repeal" of section 787.81
In Harris, the court also confronted the question whether the
Right to Truth-in-Evidence provision allowed a party to impeach
a witness with a misdemeanor conviction. 2 Evidence Code
section 788 restricts the impeaching party to felony convictions. 3
But since misdemeanor convictions can be as relevant as felony
convictions to impeachment, the court concluded that the felony
limitation is no longer enforceable in criminal cases in
California. 4 Like section 787, section 788 was not exempted from
the operation of the Right to Truth-in-Evidence provision of
Proposition 8.5
If the California courts adopt a plain meaning approach every
time they construe a provision of Proposition 8, most, if not all, of
the restrictions on the admissibility of relevant evidence would be
swept away. 6 It would be a mistake, however, to conclude that
the Supreme Court of California has completely embraced either
textualism in general or its "plain meaning" variant in interpreting
Proposition 8, because on two other occasions, the court balked at
reading Proposition 8 literally.
B. The Supreme Court of California's Occasional Refusal to Apply
a "Plain Meaning" Approach to the Construction of
Proposition 8
1. People v. Castro
In People v. Castro7 the court's task was to distill the
meaning of the following language in Proposition 8: "Any prior
felony conviction of any person in any criminal proceeding,
81. Harris, 47 Cal. 3d at 1081-82, 767 P.2d at 640, 255 Cal. Rptr. at 373.
82. Id. at 1090 n.22, 767 P.2d 647 n.22, 255 Cal. Rptr. 380 n.22.
83. CAL EVID. CODE § 788 (West 1966).
84. Harris, 47 Cal. 3d at 1091 n.22, 767 P.2d at 647 n.22, 255 Cal. Rptr. 352, 380 n.22.
85. See CAL CONST. art. 1, § 28(d) (codifying, in pat, Proposition 8).
86. Mdndez, supra note 13, at 1020-21.
87. 38 Cal. 3d 301, 696 P.2d 111, 211 Cal. Rptr. 719 (1985).
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whether adult or juvenile, shall be used without limitation for
purposes of impeachment . . . .,, The plain meaning of this
provision appears inescapable: Any party to any criminal
proceeding can impeach any witness with any conviction so long
as it is a felony. Indeed, in Castro, Justice Lucas argued vigorously
that the language meant precisely what it seemed to say; a
prosecutor could use any felony conviction to impeach any defense
witness.89
The majority disagreed. Speaking for the court, Justice Kaus
found the "without limitation" provision ambiguous, partly
because it conflicted with the language in Proposition 8 subjecting
the admissibility of all relevant evidence to discretionary exclusion
under Evidence Code section 352.90 Justice Kaus resolved the
ambiguity by construing the Right to Truth-in-Evidence provision
as giving judges limited authority to exclude some convictions."
Since a fair trial requires " 'that a jury consider only
relevant and competent evidence bearing on the issue of guilt or
innocence,' "92 Justice Kaus held that federal due process requires
trial judges to exclude convictions having no bearing on the
witness' lack of veracity.93
In Justice Kaus' view, Proposition 8 had to be construed in
light of the dictates of the national constitution. To ensure that
convictions bear a rational relation to a witness' readiness to lie,
Justice Kaus read a "moral turpitude" ingredient into the
provision.94 Chief Justice Bird agreed: At a minimum, federal
88. Victims' Bill of Rights, Initiative Measure Proposition 8 (approved June 8,1982) (codified
at CAL. CONST. art , §§ 12, 28; CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 25, 667, 1191.1, 1192.7, 3043 (West Supp.
1992); CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 1732.5, 1767, 6331 (West Supp. 1992)); Castro, 38 Cal. 3d
at 305 n.1, 696 P.2d at 112 n.1, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 720 n.1.
89. Castro, 38 Cal. 3d at.322, 696 P.2d at 125,211 Cal. Rptr. at 732 (Lucas, J., concurring
and dissenting).
90. lt at 306, 696 P.2d at 113, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 721.
91. Izd at 311-13, 696 P.2d at 116-18, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 724-25.
92. i. at 313, 696 P.2d at 118, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 726 (quoting Bruton v. United States, 391
U.S. 123, 131 n.6 (1968)).
93. Id.
94. Id. at 314, 696 P.2d at 119, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 726-27.
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constitutional concerns required the engrafting of a threshold
relevance requirement.95
The Castro court's unwillingness to read Proposition 8 literally
is understandable. But as is discussed in Part I1,96 the majority's
conclusion that it would violate due process to admit all felonies
for impeachment purposes is debatable. However, assuming the
court's constitutional concerns are valid, even some textualists
would approve of the court's construction of Proposition 8. For
example, in construing the Federal Rules of Evidence, most
members of the United States Supreme Court have applied a
textualist approach.
97
Even textualist justices have refused to read the Federal Rules
of Evidence literally when doing so would lead to a result which
might be unconstitutional.9" In Green v. Bock Laundry Machine
Co.,99 the United States Supreme Court struggled with the
meaning of Rule 609 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, 1°° a
provision corresponding to California Evidence Code section 788
governing impeachment by convictions.' Writing for the
majority, Justice Stevens pointed out that the language of the rule
suggested an irrational, arguably unconstitutional distinction
between civil plaintiffs and civil defendants."w For that reason,
"[n]o matter how plain the text of the Rule may be," the Court
refused to construe the statute literally.
0 3
95. Id at 325-28, 696 P.2d at 126-29, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 734-37 (Bird, ., concurring and
dissenting).
96. See infra notes 153-258 and accompanying text.
97. Jonakait, supra note 73, at 761.
98. Id
99. 490 U.S. 504 (1989).
100. Fan. IL EvIo. 609.
101. CAL EV. CODE § 788 (West 1966).
102. Green, 490 U.S. at 511 n.9.
103. Id at 510.
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2. People v. Harris Revisited
In one part of the People v. Harris"' decision, the Supreme
Court of California approved and applied the plain meaning
doctrine to the Right to Truth-in-Evidence provision." 5 However,
in another portion of the Harris decision, the court rejected a literal
interpretation of the same provision.10 6
In Harris, the accused offered evidence of a polygraph
examination he had taken before trial.10 7 Long before the passage
of Proposition 8, the Supreme Court of California adolted the Frye
test to determine the admissibility of scientific evidence. 10 8 Under
Frye, evidence based on a scientific technique is admissible only
if the technique is generally accepted within the relevant scientific
circles. °9 The overwhelming majority of courts which have
applied Frye to polygraph examinations have concluded that
polygraphs do not meet this standard."0
The accused in Harris argued that Frye was no longer good law
in California after the enactment of Proposition 8."' Shortly after
the passage of Proposition 8, several commentators, including
Professors Uelmen and Mndez, asserted that the passage of the
initiative sounded the death knell for the Frye rule in
California." 2 Since any scientific evidence germane to the issues
being tried is logically relevant even if it is not generally accepted
by the relevant scientific community, these commentators argued
that the Right to Truth-in-Evidence provision overruled Frye. The
Harris court rejected this argument."' Mistakenly equating
reliability with relevance, the court held that judges still retain the
104. 47 Cal. 3d 1047, 767 P.2d 619, 255 Cal. Rptr. 352 (1989).
105. See supra notes 82-85 and accompanying text (discussing the court's conclusion that for
impeachment purposes, the prosecution is no longer limited to felony convictions).
106. Harris, 47 Cal. 3d at 1094, 767 P.2d at 649, 255 Cal. Rptr. at 382.
107. id.
108. People v. Kelly, 17 Cal. 3d 24, 549 P.2d 1240, 130 Cal. Rptr. 144 (1976).
109. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
110. See P. GANNLU & E. IMVDWIMX, SCINTIIc EvjDwENc § 8-3 (1986).
111. Harris, 47 Cal. 3d at 1094, 767 P.2d at 649, 255 Cal. Rptr. at 382.
112. See Uelmen, supra note 35, at 43, 45; M~ndez, supra note 13, at 1031-37.
113. Harris, 47 Cal. 3d at 1094, 767 P.2d at 649, 255 Cal. Rptr. at 382.
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power under Evidence Code section 352 to exclude scientific
evidence that fails the Frye test:
The motion [to admit the polygraph evidence] was made, and the
argument here rests on the assumption that section 28(d) has eliminated
restrictions on the admissibility of polygraph results. Adoption of
section 28(d) did not, however, abrogate generally accepted rules by
which the reliability and thus relevance of scientific evidence is
determined. [Citation omitted.] The reliability of a scientific technique,
therefore, is determined under the requirement of Evidence Code section
350, that '[n]o evidence is admissible except relevant evidence,' a
provision necessarily incorporated by reference into Evidence Code
section 352, which is expressly preserved by section 28(d).",
The Harris majority's mistake is patent: Reliability and
relevance are different concepts. When the Supreme Court of
California adopted the Frye test, it acknowledged that Frye often
results in excluding relevant evidence." 5  Though excluding
unreliable evidence may be justified as necessary to protect the fact
finding process, a literal reading of Proposition 8 clearly requires
the abandonment of Frye.
Harris is not unprecedented, however. Courts in other
jurisdictions have refused to enforce the seemingly "plain"
meaning of evidentiary statutes when doing so would result in the
114. Id. at 1094, 767 P.2d at 649, 255 Cal. Rptr. at 382. The court's continued adherence to
the Frye test despite Proposition 8 is not unqualified, however. In People v. Stoll, 49 Cal. 3d 1136,
783 P.2d 698,265 Cal. Rptr. 111 (1989), the court held that the effect of Proposition 8 on Frye was
still an open question, at least with regard to the type of scientific evidence involved in that case:
We need not decide whether section 28(d) affected the Kelly/Frye rule.... Section 28(d)
has no effect on the outcome of this case because, as discussed in the opinion, the type
of professional testimony proffered here has always been admissible under these
authorities. The parties and lower courts have assumed that these prior rules remain intact
in the wake of section 28(d).
Stoll 49 Cal. 3d at 1152 n.16, 783 P.2d at 707 n.16, 255 Cal. Rptr. at 120 n.16. In Stoll, the issue
was the admissibility of evidence of lack of sexual deviance to show that the accused was not the
kind of person who was likely to commit the sexual misconduct charged. I. Although Harris
predated Stoll, the court did not elaborate on the relationship between the holding in Stoll and its
earlier Harris ruling.
115. People v. Kelly, 17 Cal. 3d 24,30, 549 P.2d 1240, 1244, 130 Cal. Rptr. 144, 148 (1976).
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admission of suspect evidence.1 ' The Kansas Supreme Court's
decision in State v. Davis117 is instructive. In Davis the
prosecution offered evidence of the accused's other crimes. When
the defense objected to the evidence, the prosecution urged the
court to adopt a literal interpretation of the Kansas equivalent to
California's Evidence Code section 352. Like section 352, Kansas'
Civil Procedure section 60-445 empowers trial judges to exclude
otherwise relevant evidence for specified reasons. 8 Unlike
section 352, the Kansas rule does not include undue prejudice
among the reasons listed." 9
The Davis court pointed out that many Kansas prosecutors have
argued that Kansas' Rule 60-445 deprived the judiciary of the
common law power to exclude evidence on the ground of its
prejudicial character. 2° Like the Harris court, the Davis court
rebuffed this argument.2 1 The Davis court rejected the "plain
meaning" argument in order to preserve a power all judges should
have -- namely, the power to exclude evidence so prejudicial that
its use would seriously distort the fact finding process." In
much the same way, the Harris court sought to protect the fact
finding process by upholding the Frye test despite Proposition 8's
plain meaning.
116. Imwinkelried, The Need to Amend Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b): The Threat to the
Future of the Federal Rules of Evidence, 30 VILL. L. REV. 1465, 1494-98 (1985) (citing People v.
Kelly, 17 Cal. 3d 24,549 P.2d 1240, 130 Cal. Rptr. 144 (1976) and State v. Davis, 213 Kan. 54,515
P.2d 802 (1973)).
117. 213 Kan. 54, 515 P.2d 802 (1973).
118. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-445 (1983).
119. See id. (setting forth the Kansas rule regarding exclusion of otherwise relevant evidence).
120. Davis, 213 Kan. at 57, 515 P.2d at 804.
121. Id) at 58-59, 515 P.2d at 805-06.
122. Id.
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II. THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA'S APPROACH
To EVIDENCE CODE SECTION 352 AFrER PROPOSITION 8
After the enactment of Proposition 8, Evidence Code section
352 acquired new importance. To appreciate the enhanced role of
section 352 in the post Proposition 8 environment, it helps to
understand its place before the initiative.
Section 352 embodies the principle that judges may exclude
otherwise relevant evidence when the value of. the evidence is
outweighed by important countervailing concerns."' These
concerns include the risks that the evidence may unduly prejudice
a party, confuse the issues, or mislead the jury.' Section 352
accords judges a discretionary power of exclusion, not one of
admission. The balancing power conferred upon judges by section
352 does not make admissible, evidence barred by other provisions
of the Evidence Code.
Proposition 8 vastly increased the power vested in judges by
section 352. By eliminating most exclusionary rules barring the use
of certain categories of relevant evidence, while at the same time
exempting section 352 from its operation, Proposition 8 gave
judges the discretion to admit or reject evidence that had formerly
been categorically excluded by specific rules. Character evidence
is a case in point. Prior to Proposition 8, character evidence was
inadmissible as a matter of law to prove that the accused
committed the offense charged." 5 Now its admissibility depends
on how judges exercise their discretion under section 352.
A fundamental, and still unanswered, question concerning
section 352 is whether the discretionary powers embodied in the
statute are granted only to trial judges, or whether appellate judges
can use the section to lay down rules of general application in all
criminal trials. The answer to this question will determine whether
the appellate courts will play a significant role in shaping the
admissibility of character evidence in the post-Proposition 8 world.
123. CAL EvID. CODE § 352 (West 1966).
124. Id.
125. Id § 1101(a) (West 1966).
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In answering the question, the Supreme Court of California has two
choices.
A. The First Choice: Construing California Evidence Code section
352 as Precluding Appellate Courts from Formulating
Exclusionary Rules of General Applicability
One choice available to the Supreme Court of California would
be a literal construction of Evidence Code section 352. The court
could interpret the section as limited authorization for trial judges
to exclude otherwise admissible evidence on the basis of an ad hoc,
case-specific balancing of probative worth against prejudice. Under
this scheme, the California appellate judiciary would have a narrow
role; the appellate courts' only function would be to review trial
court decisions for abuse of discretion. For several reasons, this
interpretation is plausible.
To begin with, the wording of section 352 is virtually identical
to that of Federal Rule of Evidence 403,126 and the trend in
federal decisions is to limit the appellate courts' Rule 403 review
in this manner. 27 Furthermore, this choice would be consistent
with the concerns which inspired Proposition 8; namely, it
addresses the "judicially created restrictions" on the use of
convictions to impeach witnesses that drew the wrath of the
proponents of the initiative.128 These restrictions had been created
by appellate courts under the aegis of section 352.129
In People v. Castro130 the majority acknowledged that
opposition to judicially created restrictions was one of the driving
126. See Imwinkehied, When In Doubt; Admit: Identical State and Federal Provisions on the
Admission of Relevant Evidence Should Be Interpreted Identically, 10 CAL. LAW., Dec. 1990, at 72-
73.
127. See generally Mengler, The Theory of Discretion in the Federal Rules of Evidence, 74
IOWA L. REv. 413 (1989).
128. People v. Castro, 38 Cal. 3d 301,322,696 P.2d 111, 125,211 Cal. Rptr. 719,732 (1985)
(Lucas, I., concurring and dissenting).
129. See, e.g., People v. Antick, 15 Cal. 3d 79,96-99,539 P.2d 43,54-56, 123 Cal. Rptr. 475,
486-88 (1975); People v. Beagle, 6 Cal. 3d 441,451-54,492 P.2d 1, 7-10,99 Cal. Rptr. 313,319-21
(1972).
130. 38 Cal. 3d 301, 696 P.2d 111,211 Cal. Rptr. 719 (1985). See supra notes 87-103 and
accompanying text (discussing the Castro decision).
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forces behind Proposition 8.131 In light of this concession,
limiting the appellate courts' review under section 352 would be
especially attractive; it would deprive the appellate judiciary of the
power to create the very type of exclusionary evidentiary rules that
galvanized the proponents of Proposition 8.
B. The Second Choice: Construing California Evidence Code
section 352 as Empowering the Appellate Courts to Enforce
Uncodified General Exclusionary Rules in Rare Cases
A second choice would allow the appellate courts to continue
to look to Evidence Code section 352 as a source of judicial
authority to enforce exclusionary rules of general applicability--at
least in those cases in which admitting such evidence would
contradict longstanding legislative and judicial judgments
disfavoring the use of certain types of testimony. In People v.
Harris132 the Supreme Court of California seemingly opted for
this choice.
In Harris, it will be recalled, the accused argued that he had a
right to introduce relevant, exculpatory polygraph evidence without
meeting the requirements enunciated in Frye v. United States.
133
The defendant grounded his argument on the Right to Truth-in-
Evidence provision of Proposition 8, which, in his view, overturned
Frye.
134
Despite the plain meaning of Proposition 8, the court rejected
Harris' argument and held per se inadmissible scientific evidence
that fails the Frye test.135 Implicit in this holding is the
131. Castro, 38 Cal. 3dat302,309,320,323,696 P.2d at 115, 122,125,211 Cal. Rptr. at722,
730, 732.
132. 47 Cal. 3d 1047, 767 P.2d 619, 255 Cal. Rptr. 352 (1989). See supra notes 75-86 and
accompanying text (discussing the Harris decision).
133. See supra notes 104-115 and accompanying text (discussing this portion of the Harris
decision).
134. See supra notes 111-114 and accompanying text (discussing the Harris decision).
135. Harris, 47 Cal. 3d at 1094-95, 767 P.2d at 649-50, 255 Cal. Rptr. at 382-83. The court
has since backed away from its embrace of the Frye test. See supra note 114 (discussing People v.
Stol1, 49 Cal. 3d 1136, 783 P.2d 698, 265 Cal. Rptr. 111 (1989), in which the Supreme Court of
California held that the effect of Proposition 8 on the Frye doctrine was still open to question
regarding certain types of evidence).
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assumption that appellate courts may use section 352 to enforce
uncodified exclusionary rules that are essential to a reliable fact
finding process.
Although the Harris court's choice was not inevitable, in
retrospect the choice was not surprising. If the court had chosen to
limit appellate review under section 352 to the narrow question of
abuse of discretion by the trial court,136 such a choice would have
entailed a fundamental reallocation of power between the appellate
judiciary and the trial bench.'37 As Professor M6ndez pointed out
in his earlier article, under this choice, Proposition 8 would shift an
enormous amount of decision-making power from the appellate
courts to the trial judges.33 Appellate courts could no longer
invoke section 352 as a basis for announcing general exclusionary
rules of evidence, 139 and the only real power under section 352
would be in the hands of the trial judges. 140 To a great extent,
evidentiary doctrine would become "trial court... law."
141
In the history of California evidence law, attempts to shift
authority from the appellate to the trial courts have been markedly
unsuccessful. For example, at one time, California considered
adopting the Model Code of Evidence. 42 Adoption was
ultimately rejected,'43 in part due to opposition by the state bar.
The bar "bitterly attacked"'" the Model Code "largely because
of provisions thought to increase the power of the trial judge."
145
Years later, the legislature accepted the recommendation of the
California Law Revision Commission and enacted California's
Evidence Code. The official comments make it crystal clear that
136. See supra notes 114-115 and accompanying text (discussing this construction of Evidence
Code section 352).
137. See generally Mengler, The Theory of Discretion in the Federal Rules of Evidence, 74
IOWA L. REV. 413, 417 (1989).
138. M6ndez, supra note 13, at 1037.
139. Id at 1059.
140. Id at 1005, 1038.
141. Graham, California's "'Restatement" of Evidence: Some Reflections on Appellate Repair
of the Codification Fiasco, 4 Loy. L.A.L. Rnv. 279, 284 (1971).
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the Commission's intent was to abolish uncodified, common law
exclusionary rules of evidence.'46 Given this legislative history,
one would think that adopting the Evidence Code would have
abolished such judicially created limitations as the corpus delicti
rule. 47 This rule prohibits the prosecution from introducing an
accused's confession until the prosecution has introduced some
evidence corroborating the commission of the charged crime (the
corpus delicti). 43 Though the courts have never held the rule to
be of constitutional dimension and the California Evidence Code
does not codify it, the corpus delicti rule is still enforced. 149 One
can imagine a trial judge excluding a confession under section 352
in a given case; but in light of the Commission's comments to the
Evidence Code, continued appellate enforcement of the corpus
delicti doctrine seems indefensible. Yet, when the question was
squarely presented, at least one California appellate court upheld
the rule in People v. Starr.5 To be sure, the Starr court did not
rely on the California Evidence Code in reaching its decision.
Rather, the court justified its holding on the rule's "firmly
established" lineage and its "fundamental" function in regulating
the admissibility of evidence that can be highly prejudicial."'
There is, of course, merit in preserving uncodified rules that are
essential to maintaining the integrity of the fact finding process.
Castro and Harris demonstrate that when a literal interpretation of
Proposition 8 would imperil the constitutionality or reliability of
the fact finding process, the Supreme Court of California is willing
to abandon the plain meaning doctrine to preserve an uncodified
exclusionary rule.l"' The pivotal question is whether the court
146. Id at 285.
147. See Comment, Reevaluation of the Calffornia Corpus Delicti Rule: A Response to the
Invitation of Proposition 8, 78 CALIP. L. REV. 1571, 1574 (1990).
148. E DIm RuD, P. GINNEu, F. GnIuOAN & F. LEDERER, COURTROOM CRmNAL
EVIDENCE § 2321 (1987) (hereinafter COURTROOM CRIMINAL EVIDENCE).
149. Graham, California's "Restatement" of Evidence: Some Reflections on Appellate Repair
of the Codification Fiasco, 4 LOY. L.A.L. REV. 279, 285, 293 (1971).
150. 11 Cal. App. 3d 574, 583, 89 Cal. Rptr. 906, 912 (1970).
151. Id at 583, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 912.
152. See People v. Harris, 47 Cal. 3d 1047,767 P.2d 619,255 Cal. Rptr. 352 (1989) (discussed
supra notes 75-86,104-115 and accompanying text); People v. Castro, 38 Cal. 3d 301,696 P.2d 111,
211 Cal. Rptr. 719 (1985) (discussed supra notes 87-103 and accompanying text).
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should use the Castro and Harris approaches to reinstate the
character evidence rule.
III. THE PROPRIETY OF USING CALIFORNiA EVIDENCE
CODE SECTION 352 As A BASIS FOR CONIINUING To
ENFORCE THE "OLD" LAW ON CHARACTER EVIDENCE
A. The Weaknesses of the Justifications Cited in Castro and Harris
Harris and Castro advanced three justifications for deviating
from a literal, textualist interpretation to uphold an uncodified
exclusionary rule of evidence.
1. The Uncodified Exclusionary Rule's Function of Shielding
the Trier of Fact from Unreliable Evidence
Implicit in the Harris court's continued adherence to the Frye
test was the Supreme Court of California's concern that the trier of
fact should be shielded from unreliable evidence."' That concern
echoed earlier pronouncements by the court about the dangerous
character of scientific evidence. For example, in one of the leading
statistical evidence cases, People v. Collins,154  the court
characterized mathematics as "a veritable sorcerer in our
computerized society" -- a sorcerer who threatens to "cast a spell"
over the trier of fact. 155 Later, in People v. Kelly,156 the court
complained about the "misleading aura of certainty which often
envelops a new scientific process. . . .,15' The essential fear is
that lay triers of fact will overestimate the probative worth of
scientific testimony;15' because they lack scientific training, a
153. People v. Harris, 47 Cal. 3d 1047, 1094, 767 P.2d 619, 649, 255 Cal. Rptr. 352, 382
(1989).
154. 68 Cal. 2d 319, 438 P.2d 33, 66 Cal. Rptr. 497 (1968).
155. Id. at 320, 438 P.2d at 33, 66 Cal. Rptr. at 497.
156. 17 Cal. 3d 24, 549 P.2d 1240, 130 Cal. Rptr. 144 (1976).
157. Id, at 32,549 P.2d at 1245, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 149 (quoting U.S. v. Addison, 498 P.2d 741,
744 (1974)).
158. Imwinkelried, The Standard for Admitting Scientific Evidence: A Critique from the
Perspective of Juror Psychology, 28 VILL. L. REV. 554, 562-63 (1983).
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juror or judge might give the testimony "unwarranted
weight."'159
But the court's concerns may be nothing more than forceful
ipse dixit. Whether jurors can evaluate scientific evidence critically
can be investigated empirically; merely asserting that judges and
lay jurors are incapable of weighing scientific testimony properly
does not necessarily make it so. Indeed, although the empirical
research to date is not conclusive, available data indicate that the
court may be wrong.
The starting point for any discussion of the competence of
American jurors must be the Chicago Jury Project," undeniably
the most intense study ever conducted on the capacity of lay jurors
in the United States. The project produced the landmark text, The
American Jury, by Professors Kalven and Zeisel.' 6' One of the
questions investigated was whether juries adequately understand the
evidence. The researchers found that "the jury does by and large
understand the facts and gets the case straight."' 62 The finding
is especially pertinent because many of the cases studied in the
project involved scientific evidence.
163
A later phase of the project dealt with psychiatric
testimony.' Again, the researchers concluded that the lay jurors
appreciated the essence of the expert testimony presented to
them.165
Other data also belies the assumption that lay jurors are awed
by scientific evidence. Studies of judicial experiences with the
polygraph in Massachusetts, Michigan, Utah, Wisconsin, and
Canada found that jurors frequently rejected polygraph evidence
and returned verdicts inconsistent with the polygraphist's
testimony.'6 Summarizing the Wisconsin data, Robert Peters of
the Wisconsin Department of Justice Cime Laboratory Bureau
159. Mdndez, supra note 13, at 1033.
160. See generally, H. KALVEN & H. ZisEL, THE AMRICAN JuRy (1966).
161. Id
162. Id at 149.
163. Id at 137.
164. R. SIMON, THE JURY AND TBm DEFENsE oF INsANITY (1967).
165. Id at 217-18.
166. See Imwinkehried, supra note 158, at 567 (collecting the studies).
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stated that "polygraph evidence does not assume undue influence
in the evidentiary scheme.'
' x67
Another survey canvassed cases involving sound spectrography
(voiceprint) evidence. These investigators discovered that when the
prosecution introduced sound spectrography evidence against an
accused, the conviction rate was eleven percent lower than
average. 16
8
Several studies have found that, rather than being overwhelmed
by statistical testimony, jurors tend to underutilize the evidence
during deliberations.'69  Summarizing the studies, two
commentators concluded that "[tjhe image of a spellbound jury
mesmerized by... a [scientific] expert is more likely to reflect
.. . fantasies than the... realities of courtroom testimony."'
170
In short, Harris' concern with shielding jurors from unreliable
scientific evidence does not withstand close scrutiny.
2. The Generally Accepted Character of the Uncodified
Exclusionary Rule
The court's deference to such "generally accepted rules" as the
Frye test is another underpinning of the Harris decision.'' If by
its reference to "established rules" the court meant longstanding
rules, the Frye rule hardly qualifies. Unlike the best evidence,
hearsay, opinion rules and the ban on the use of character evidence,
Frye is an exclusively American invention 72 of relatively recent
167. Peters, A Survey of Polygraph Evidence in Criminal Trials, 68 A.B.A. J. 162, 165 (1982).
168. Greene, Voiceprint Identification: The Case in Favor of Admissibility, 13 AM. CRIM. L.
R v. 171, 190-91 (1975).
169. Faigman & Baglioni, Bayes' Theorem in the Trial Process: Instructing Jurors on the
Value of Statistical Evidence, 12 LAW & Hum. BEHAv. 1, 13-16 (1988); Thompson & Schumann,
Interpretation of Statistical Evidence in Criminal Trials: The Prosecutor's Fallacy and the Defense
Attorney's Fallacy, 11 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 167, 183 (1987).
170. Rogers & Ewing, Ultimate Opinion Proscriptions: A Cosmetic Fix and a Plea for
Empiricism, 13 LAw & HUM. BEHAv. 357, 363 (1989).
171. People v. Harris, 47 Cal. 3d 1047, 1094, 767 P.2d 619, 649, 255 Cal. Rptr. 352, 382
(1989).
172. Imwinkelried, A Comparative Law Analysis of the Standard for Admitting Scientific
Evidence: The United States Stands Alone, 42 FOREiSIC SC. IN'L 15, 16 (1989) (hereinafter
Imwinkelried).
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origin; a 1923 decision of the Circuit Court for the District of
Columbia. 73
The Frye rule has been rejected by the Canadian courts,"
and by over one-third of the American jurisdictions that have
considered its application.175 Frye is currently under attack in
many of the states which have adopted the Federal Rules of
Evidence.'76 Since thirty-four states have patterned their codes
after the Federal Rules,'" Frye may well become a minority rule
by the end of the century.
As a matter of California law, the Frye rule is even more
recent. The California courts first cited Frye in 1950,178 and it
was not until 1976 that the Supreme Court of California adopted
the Frye test for use by California judges.
179
3. The Need to Interpret Proposition 8 to Eliminate Serious
Doubts About its Constitutionality
Just as Harris departed from the plain meaning of Proposition
8 to justify continued enforcement of Frye, Castro likewise refused
to read the initiative literally. Despite the apparent plain meaning
of the felony impeachment provision of Proposition 8, the Castro
court limited impeachment to felonies involving moral
turpitude. 8 ' The majority defended its holding on the ground that
a narrow construction was necessary to save the provision from
possible infmnity under the fourteenth amendment.' 8' Speaking
for the majority, Justice Kaus argued that due process requires "a
173. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
174. See Imwinkelried, supra note 172, at 21.
175. See generally P. GIANNHnL & E. IMWINKELRIED, SCIENTIFC EVIDENCE §§ 1-5, 1-6
(1986); Imwinkelried, supra note 158, at 557-59.
176. P. GIANNEL & E. IMWINKmLIE, supra note 110, at § 1-5(f).
177. R. CARsoN, E. IwINKLmm & E. KIONKA, EVIDENCE IN Tm NINErMS 26-27 (3d ed.
1991) (hereinafter EVIDENCE N Tim NINmrr).
178. People v. Wochnick, 98 Cal. App. 2d 124, 127,219 P.2d 70,72 (1950), cert. denied, 342
U.S. 888 (1951).
179. People v. Kelly, 17 Cal. 3d 24,30,549 P.2d 1240, 1244, 130 Cal. Rptr. 144, 148 (1976).
180. People v. Castro, 38 Cal. 3d 301,313-15,696 P.2d 111, 118-19, 211 Cal. Rptr. 719,726-
27 (1985).
181. Id, at 314-17, 696 P.2d at 118-20, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 725-28.
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rational connection" between a person's credibility and any item
of evidence offered for impeachment. 82 Admitting items that
lack the requisite connection would be "so irrational" as to offend
due process."8 3 In Justice Kaus' judgment, only felonies involving
moral turpitude possess the minimum connection necessary to
permissibly impeach credibility.1"4
There is some authority supporting the majority's position. In
her separate opinion, Chief Justice Bird cited a 1967 New
Hampshire Supreme Court decision declaring that "the use of prior
convictions to show nothing more than a disposition to commit
crime... would violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment." 1"5 Chief Justice Bird also pointed to dictum in
Spencer v. Texas.186 In Spencer the United States Supreme Court
suggested that introducing an accused's prior conviction for
impeachment purposes is constitutionally permissible only when the
nature of the underlying crime is "particularly probative" of
credibility.
8 7
These cases, however, are not unassailable authority for the
proposition that convictions lacking moral turpitude offend due
process. The United States Supreme Court has not decided the
issue. Moreover, if this proposition is correct, the United States
Supreme Court would most likely be obligated to invalidate
important provisions of the federal rule regulating impeachment by
conviction. Federal Rule of Evidence 609(a), as amended in 1990,
provides that:
For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness, (1) evidence
that a witness other than an accused has been convicted of a crime shall
be admitted, subject to Rule 403, if the crime was punishable by death
182. Id. at 313, 696 P.2d at 118, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 726.
183. Id. at 315, 696 P.2d at 119, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 727.
184. Id. at 314, 696 P.2d at 119, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 726-27.
185. Id. at 330, 696 P.2d at 130, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 738 (Bird, CJ., concurring and dissenting)
(quoting State v. Cote, 108 N.H. 290, 297,235 A.2d 111, 116, cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1025 (1968)).
186. Id. at 332-33, 696 P.2d at 131, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 739 (Bird, CJ., concurring and
dissenting) (citing Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554, 560-61 (1967)).
187. Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554, 560-61 (1967). See Mdndez, supra note 13, at 1028
(interpreting Spencer as requiring convictions to be especially probative of the accused's lack of
veracity in order for their use to conform with due process).
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or imprisonment in excess of one year under the law under which the
witness was convicted, and evidence that an accused has been convicted
of such a crime shall be admitted if the court determines that the
probative value of admitting this evidence outweighs its prejudicial
effect to the accused; and (2) evidence that any witness has been
convicted of a crime shall be admitted if it involved dishonesty or false
statement, regardless of the punishment.
188
Convictions falling under Rule 609(a)(2) clearly possess the
rational connection Castro mandated. Dishonesty and false
statement are probative of lack of veracity. But Rule 609(a)(1) is
not limited to offenses entailing moral turpitude. Subject to Federal
Rule 403 (the federal equivalent of California Evidence Code
section 352), any felony conviction can be used to impeach any
witness other than the accused, and any felony conviction can be
used against the accused if the trial judge determines that its
probative value outweighs its prejudicial effect. 89
To date, no commentator or court has suggested that due
process requires the United States Supreme Court to read a moral
turpitude limitation into Rule 609(a)(1). Courts and commentators
have good reason for refraining from making that suggestion. In
Luck v. United States,'90 the circuit court for the District of
Columbia construed a statute allowing evidence of prior
convictions to be used to affect a person's "credit as a
witness ' 191 as giving federal judges discretion to exclude
convictions having little or no bearing on a witness' lack of
veracity."9 After the Luck decision, Congress amended the statute
to strip federal judges of discretion to exclude convictions.193 The
same judge who wrote Luck sustained the amendment's
constitutionality against arguments that the unlimited use of
convictions to impach violated due process. 94
188. FED. I. EVID. 609(a).
189. Id.
190. 348 F.2d 763 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
191. D.C. CODE ANN. § 305 (1961).
192. Luck, 348 F.2d at 767-68.
193. Pub. L. No. 91-358, 84 Stat. 473 (1970).
194. United States v. Belt, 514 F.2d 837, 848-49 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
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Case law aside, the Castro majority's argument is unsound.
Rather, the constitutionality of admitting testimony about a witness'
past acts to impeach a witness' credibility should turn on two
factors.
The first factor should be the trustworthiness of the evidence
that the witness committed the felony. Assume that the witness is
the accused. If the evidence of the accused's alleged misdeed is
weak, admitting the evidence might well violate due process.
195
But in the case of convictions the evidence is reliable. The accused
either admitted committing the crime by a plea of guilty or has
been found guilty of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Not
surprisingly, some commentators assert that a conviction is "the
strongest proof" of the perpetration of the underlying act.
196
The second factor focuses on the relationship between the
conviction and the witness' lack of credibility. Does the convicted
offense say anything about the witness' lack of veracity as a
witness? In answering this question, Justice Kaus emphasized such
ethical qualities as "moral laxity"'
9 7 and "moral depravity. ' 198
To Justice Kaus, truth-telling is a moral function, unlikely to be
discharged by individuals who engage in immoral acts.' 99 That
being so, it made eminently good sense to require the felony to
entoil moral turpitude.
But there is a more useful way of characterizing the question
before the Castro court. As the natural law tradition in American
law has waned, courts and legislatures have abandoned moralistic
standards and replaced them with secular ones. For example, Lord
Mansfield's view that moral obligation should be the basis for
enforcing contractual promises has been replaced by Williston's
195. Cf E. IMWInKEIaED, UNCHARGED MIscoNDucr EVIDEN E § 10:12 (1984) (discussing
the invocation of the due process clause to bar the admission of flimsy, inflammatory evidence of
an accused's uncharged misconduct).
196. Note, Evidence of Other Crimes in Montana, 30 MONT. L. REV. 235, 238 (1969). See
Graham, Evidence as to Character - Other Crimes, Wrongs, or Acts, 19 CRIM. L. BULL. 349, 349
n.3 (1983) (setting forth acceptable types of proof of uncharged misconduct).
197. People v. Castro, 38 Cal. 3d 301,316,696 P.2d 111, 120,211 Cal. Rptr. 719,728 (1985).
198. Id at 315, 696 P.2d at 119, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 727.
199. Id. at 313-16, 696 P.2d at 118-20, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 725-28.
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position that legal value ought be the test of consideration, as that
test is far more certain.
2 °°
The same trend found in the law of contracts can be discerned
in the law of evidence. In passing on the competency of
prospective witnesses, the common law insisted that the witness
recognize a moral duty to tell the truth.2°1 Today, most
jurisdictions inquire whether the prospective witness has the
cognitive ability to understand the legal nature and consequences
of an oath.2' The underlying consensus is that a legal standard
is more predictable and judicially manageable.
In Castro, Justice Lucas and Chief Justice Bird appealed to
contemporary legal standards. Justice Lucas condemned the moral
turpitude standard as "confusing and uncertain."2 3 Chief Justice
Bird criticized it as lacking "clear guidance." 2 " In Chief Justice
Bird's judgment, the moral turpitude test provided "no certainty of
application."
20 5
Precisely because the moral test is so uncertain, the Castro
court should have resorted to a secular legal standard. As Justice
Kaus conceded, the ultimate question the trier must answer is
whether the witness is lying in the pending case.'06 In other
words, the jury must decide if the witness is intentionally violating
the legal norm against perjury. To be a competent witness, a
person need not recognize a humanistic or ethical obligation to tell
the truth;20 7  the decisive question is whether the person
appreciates the legal norm against perjury.208 By parity of
reasoning, after a competent witness takes the stand and testifies,
the trier need not examine the moral quality of the witness'
200. E. FARNSWORTH, CoNTRAcTS § 2.8 (2d ed. 1990).
201. CoURTROOM CRIMNAL EVIDENCe, supra note 148, at § 203.
202. Id.
203. Castro, 38 Cal. 3d at 323, 696 P.2d at 125, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 733 (Lucas, J., concurring
and dissenting).
204. IM at 333-34, 696 P.2d at 132, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 740 (Bird, CJ., concurring and
dissenting).
205. Id
206. IA at 315, 696 P.2dat 125, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 727.
207. COURTROOM CRuMNAL EVIDENCE, supra note 148, at §§ 203-04.
208. Md
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testimony. Instead, the relevant question is whether the witness is
deliberately violating the secular legal norm against perjury. Thus
restated, it becomes clear that Justice Lucas' view was essentially
correct: It ought to be constitutional to admit felony convictions for
impeachment even if the underlying crime does not entail moral
turpitude.
2°9
By making the underlying act a felony, the legislature has
declared that committing the crime offends an important legal
norm. Committing perjury likewise violates an important legal
norn; that is why perjury is almost universally classified as a
felony.21 Thus, the witness' violation of one important legal
norn (committing a felony) sheds some light on the witness'
willingness to violate another important legal norm (committing
perjury), and that connection should suffice to satisfy due process.
Of course, Justice Lucas' view assumes that committing
felonies does say something about a witness' lying under oath. That
assumption, however, is valid only if the witness was aware that
his conduct in committing the felony would violate a penal law,
and nonetheless persisted in his conduct. But where the felony has
no mens rea, as where it is based on negligence or strict liability,
the volitional factor essential to relevance is lacking. Negligent
hartms are by definition unintended, and even a person who takes
every precaution to abide by the law may be guilty of a strict
liability offense. Hence, felony convictions for conduct violating
penal laws based on negligence or strict liability say nothing about
the witness' willingness to violate the laws against perjury.
Presumably, even under Justice Lucas' view the use of such
felonies to impeach the accused would be unconstitutional.
Moreover, as is discussed in the next subsection, recent findings by
social scientists suggest that even the commission of felonies
having a mens rea may shed little light on the question of whether
the witness' current testimony is truthful. Finally, as we shall see,
even assuming that the commission of a felony requiring mens rea
209. Castro, 38 Cal. 3d at 322-23, 696 P.2d at 125, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 732-33 (Lucas, J.,
concurring and dissenting).
210. R. Pmums & R. BoYCE, CRnMUAL LAW 511 (3d ed. 1982).
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is probative of the witness' predisposition to violate the legal norm
against perjury, that predisposition is not a good predictor of the
witness' veracity or mendacity at a specific trial.
Though Justice Lucas' approach is not entirely correct, he is
nonetheless more faithful to the basic tenet of American
jurisprudence that courts are not free to rewrite provisions to
eliminate every conceivable doubt about their constitutionality.21'
Courts should read provisions in a less than literal fashion only
when doing so eliminates substantial doubts about
unconstitutionality.212 Judge Posner has observed that courts
sometimes do "interpretive handsprings" to avoid deciding
constitutional questions.213 But deference to the separation of
powers doctrine should lead courts to refrain from imposing broad
"saving" constructions when narrower ones will do as well.
B. Castro and Harris as Authority for Reviving the "Old"
Character Rule
The justifications advanced in Castro and Harris for deviating
from the plain language of the Right to Truth-in-Evidence
provision (i.e., shielding the trier of fact from unreliable evidence;
the general acceptance of a particular, uncodified rule of exclusion;
and the need to interpret Proposition 8 in a manner that saves it
from possible infirmity under the federal due process clause)
provide persuasive reasons for using California Evidence Code
section 352 to return to the character evidence rules that existed
before the enactment of Proposition 8. Indeed, the justifications
apply more forcefully to reinstating the character evidence rules
than they do to preserving the Frye test or imposing a moral
turpitude limitation on the use of felony convictions.
211. People's Advocate, Inc. v. Superior Court, 181 Cal. App. 3d 329,330 n.15, 226 Cal. Rptr.
640, 648 n.15 (1986). See United States v. Broussard, 767 F. Supp. 1536, 1541 (D. Or. 1991)
(stating, "'[TMhe court may not 're-write' the statute in order to salvage it from unconstitutionality].
212. United States v. Harvey, 814 F.2d 905, 917-18 (4th Cir. 1987); EVmENCE IN THE
NINETE, supra note 177, at 699 (3d ed. 1991).
213. United States v. Marshall, 908 F.2d 1312, 1335 (7th Cir. 1990).
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1. The Rule Banning Character Evidence Clearly Shields the
Trier of Fact from Unreliable Evidence
A major thrust of Professor M6ndez' earlier article was to
demonstrate the significant risk that jurors will overvalue character
evidence as a predictor of conduct.214 The professor's article is
the most comprehensive review of the relevant psychological
research in the legal literature.
Professor M6ndez' article points out that, at one time, Gordon
Allport's trait theory was dominant in psychological circles.215
Allport's trait theory held that character consisted of a set of
personality traits and that, in turn, these traits exerted sufficient
control over a person's conduct "to produce generally consistent
behavior in widely divergent situations." 216 However, subsequent
research by Walter Mischel demonstrated that "behavior is largely
shaped by specific situational determinants which do not lend
themselves easily to predictions about individual behavior.
217
Since even seemingly trivial differences in situations can render
behavioral predictions totally invalid, inferences about future
behavior drawn from character evidence can have little or no
probative value.18
Although character evidence appears to have minimal predictive
value, the typical layperson erroneously ascribes great weight to
character as a predictor of behavior. The result, according to
Professor M~ndez, is that character evidence should be barred
because its worth as a predictor of behavior is almost nonexistent.
Moreover, even if character evidence possesses the legally required
214. Mndez, supra note 13, at 1044-59.
215. Id at 1051-52.
216. Id at 1051.
217. Id at 1052.
218. For this reason, both Justice Kaus' theory about the probative worth of convictions
involving moral turpitude and especially Justice Lucas' belief about the probative worth of any felony
conviction may well be wrong. Even committing felonies involving moral turpitude may say nothing
about a person's willingness to tell the truth as a witness, as the two situations are different.
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minimum probative worth, jurors are so likely to overestimate its
worth as to make such evidence unduly prejudicial.219
Since the publication of Professor M6ndez' article, three other
legal commentators have visited this issue. In 1986, Professor
David Leonard addressed the same topic.2 ° Though Professor
Leonard generally agreed with Professor M~ndez," he took a
slightly different position. Professor Leonard focused on the
importance of the person's "self-monitoring. 2 22 According to
Professor Leonard, if a person self-monitors his conduct, he can
diminish the influence which character traits exert on his
behavior.' Conversely, the less self-monitoring, the greater the
impact of a person's traits. 4  But like Professor M6ndez,
Professor Leonard concluded that a person's general traits have
little value in "accurately predict[ing the] single, isolated instance
of conduct" contemplated in the crime charged. -
Another commentator to address the issue was Professor David
Crump. 6 Professor Crump differs with both Professors M6ndez
and Leonard. Professor Crump contends that the psychological
studies neglect a factor relevant to courtroom use of character
evidence--the fact that "[character evidence] is subjected to cross-
examination" and attack during closing argument. 7 Professor
Crump believes that through cross-examination and summation, the
opposing attorney can alert the trier of fact to the danger of
overestimating the probative worth of character evidence.228 In
219. This is an additional reason for rejecting the use of convictions to impeach witnesses. If
the social scientists are correct, convictions not only say nothing about the truth-telling qualities of
the witness, but are likely to unduly prejudice the jurors against the witness and, perhaps, even
against the party calling the witness. Certainly where the witness is the accused, such prejudice
should result in the exclusion of the conviction on due process grounds.
220. Leonard, The Use of Character to Prove Conduct: Rationality and Catharsis in the Law
of Evidence, 58 U. CoLO. L REv. 1, 25-29 (1986-87).
221. Id. at 25 n.139.
222. Id. at 28.
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. Id at 29.
226. Cramp, How Should We Treat Character Evidence Offered to Prove Conduct?, 58 U.
CoLo. L. REv. 279, 282-84 (1987).
227. Id. at 283.
228. Id.
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addition, he reads the psychological literature somewhat differently
than either Professor M6ndez or Professor Leonard. In his review
of the literature, Professor Crump did not find a "monolithic"
condemnation of trait theory." Rather, some "[m]odem
[psychological] textbooks . . . teach Allport's view without
categorically rejecting it. . ". Professor Crump's final
assessment, however, is that the contemporary literature is
"ambivalent" about trait theory.
231
The third commentator was Ms. Susan Davis, who released her
review of the psychological literature in late 1991.232 To an
extent, Ms. Davis argues that the most recent research cuts in favor
of admitting character evidence more liberally. For example, in Ms.
Davis' mind, the research indicates that "traits exist" and that
"many things about people" can be predicted with reasonable
"levels of confidence.' ' 3 Moreover, Ms. Davis asserts that the
available research does not affirmatively demonstrate that lay jurors
will tend to overvalue character testimony. 234 However, Ms.
Davis frankly concedes that the contrary "assumption of accuracy
in real-life personal judgements has yet to be proved empirically.
",235 Further, Ms. Davis acknowledges that modem "trait
theorists willingly concede that they are unable to predict a single
instance of behavior on a particular occasion with confidence.
' 23 6
After surveying the psychological literature, Ms. Davis takes the
position that the courts should recognize a rebuttable presumption
of the inadmissibility of character evidence.
37
Whichever assessment of the psychological research one adopts,
it is clear that the demonstrated risk of overvaluing character




232. Davis, Evidence of Character to Prove Conduct: A Reassessment of Relevancy, 27 CRIM.
L BuLL., Nov.-Dec. 1991, at 504.
233. Id at 515-16.
234. Id at 533.
235. Id at 530.
236. Id at 517.
237. Id at 534.
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scientific testimony. As we have seen, the courts' assertion that lay
jurors will be mesmerized by scientific evidence has virtually no
empirical support." 8 If one adopts the view of the psychological
literature taken by Professors M6ndez and Leonard, the contrary is
true about character evidence: since Mischel's initial attack on trait
theory, most contemporary researchers have concluded that
laypersons tend to overestimate the probative value of character as
a predictor of conduct. Even assuming arguendo that Professor
Crump's or Ms. Davis' assessment of the literature is more
accurate, the case for reinstating the ban on using character
evidence is still stronger than for retaining the Frye rule. The
authorities may be divided about the value of trait theory, but
almost no authority supports the belief held by many courts that
jurors will be overwhelmed by scientific evidence."'
2. The Generally Accepted Character of the Rule Banning
Character Evidence
In contrast to the Frye doctrine, the rule banning the use of
character evidence was a part of "the early law of England.
240
Nineteenth century English writers describe the rule as a "settled
doctrine," 24' and California cases began to apply it beginning in
the mid-1800's.242 Unlike the Frye rule, today all American
jurisdictions (with the possible exception of California) apply some
form of the character evidence ban.
238. See supra notes 160-169 and accompanying text (discussing empirical studies regarding
the impact of scientific evidence on American juries).
239. See supra notes 160-169 and accompanying text (discussing empirical studies regarding
the impact of scientific evidence on American juries).
240. M. LADD & R. CARLSON, CAsES AND MATERiALS oN EVIDENcE 234 (1972).
241. Roscoi's CRmINAL EVDmENCE 94 (H. Smith & G. Kennedy 11th ed. 1890).
242. See, e.g., People v. Wade, 118 Cal. 672, 675, 50 P. 841,842 (1897); Vance v. Richardson,
110 Cal. 414, 416-17, 42 P. 909, 910 (1895); Rea v. Wood, 105 Cal. 314, 320, 38 P. 899, 900
(1894); People v. McSweeney, 4 Cal. Unrep. 924, 925-26, 38 P. 743, 743-44 (1894); Cosgrove v.
Pitman, 103 Cal. 268, 273, 37 P. 232, 233 (1894); People v. Eckman, 72 Cal. 582, 584, 14 P. 359,
360 (1887); People v. Velarde, 59 Cal. 457,462-63 (1881); People v. Shepardson, 49 Cal. 629,631-
32 (1875); People v. Fair, 43 Cal. 137, 148 (1872); People v. Stewart, 28 Cal. 395, 397 (1872);
People v. Joseph, 7 Cal. 129, 130 (1857); People v. Roberts, 6 Cal. 214, 217 (1856).
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3. Upholding the Ban on Character Evidence Eliminates
Serious Doubts About the Constitutionality of Proposition
8
Castro cited concerns about Proposition 8's constitutionality to
justify deviating from the plain meaning of the initiative. But, as
we have seen, that justification is not as convincing as the court
would have us believe. However, unlike impeachment by
convictions, the use of character evidence to prove the accused's
guilt does pose serious due process concerns.
In one respect, the practice of admitting all felony convictions
for impeachment of a witness and the practice of admitting
evidence of the accused's bad character to prove that the accused
committed the offense charged are identical. Both treat character as
circumstantial proof of conduct. In the case of impeachment, the
theory of relevance is that the acts underlying the conviction show
that the witness is willing to violate important legal norms and that
in turn shows the witness' willingness to violate another important
legal norm, namely, the prohibition against perjury.243 When the
prosecution offers evidence of the accused's bad character as proof
that the accused perpetrated the charged offense, the prosecution
resorts to essentially the same chain of reasoning.2' Evidence of
the accused's bad character shows that the accused is willing to
commit crimes and hence is predisposed to commit the crime
charged.
The Castro majority argued that due process requires that
evidence admitted for impeachment purposes possess some minimal
logical relevance to the fact of consequence, i.e., the witness'
credibility 2 45 The Castro majority would presumably demand a
similar rational nexus between items of character evidence and the
fact of consequence--the accused's predisposition to commit the
crime charged. Since both theories of admissibility rest on a similar
243. EVDMENCE IN THE NINETIEs, supra note 177, at 396-97.
244. Id. at 451-52.
245. People v. Castro, 38 Cal. 3d 301,313-14, 696 P.2d 111, 118-19, 211 Cal. Rptr. 719,725-
27 (1985).
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chain of circumstantial reasoning, both satisfy the relevance
threshold.
Despite that similarity, though, there are major differences
between the two theories. One distinction is that impeachment by
conviction is predicated on the existence of a conviction. That
conviction in turn is based either on a guilty plea or on a verdict
finding the accused guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Character
evidence, on the other hand, is predicated on misdeeds that have
not been subjected to formal adjudication, that in fact may not have
been committed, and that merely may be the subject of opinion or
reputation. Moreover, impeachment by conviction is accomplished
by the admission of the witness on the stand or the introduction of
a judgment of conviction. In contrast, proof of character evidence
can take the form of testimony about the accused's reputation, of
an acquaintance's opinion about the accused's character, or of a
specific uncharged offense.246 Such ephemeral evidence is hardly
as "trustworthy" as evidence of convictions.
Students of evidence have long been skeptical of the accuracy
and worth of reputation and opinion testimony.247 Dean Ladd
commented that "[tihe confidence which the law places in
reputation as . . . evidence of character may be seriously
doubted.""24 In the final analysis, reputation is merely aggregate
hearsay. 249 For his part, Dean McCormick stated that the use of
opinion testimony is "debatable."" 0 The opinion can easily be
distorted by the witness' bias in favor or against the accused.
Dean McCormick believed that evidence about specific acts was
the most persuasive,"1 but even that kind of evidence can be
unreliable. Precisely because of its potential to prejudice jurors, at
one time the vast majority of American jurisdictions required the
prosecution to establish the accused's commission of uncharged
246. FED. P. EVID. 405.
247. Ladd, Techniques and Theory of Character Testimony, 24 IowA L. Rv. 498,514 (1939).
248. Id
249. Id at 513.
250. C. McCoRMIcK, EvIDENcE § 187 (3d ed. 1984).
251. Id at § 186.
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acts by clear and convincing evidence. 2 In 1988 the United
States Supreme Court relaxed the standard by construing the
Federal Rules to admit evidence of uncharged misconduct as long
as the prosecution satisfies a sufficiency test with regard to the
perpetrator's identity. 3  Contrasted with impeachment by
convictions, meeting a sufficiency standard is a far cry from
proving the accused's culpability by his plea of guilty or a verdict
finding him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. 4
Worse still, the fact that character evidence is not typically
predicated on a conviction invites jurors to decide the case on an
improper basis. When the evidence of bad character does not take
the form of a conviction, the trier may conclude that the accused
unjustly escaped punishment for earlier misdeeds. 5 If the
defendant seemingly escaped unpunished, at a subconscious level
the trier may be sorely tempted to punish the accused now for the
earlier misconduct. The trier may suspect that the accused "got
away with" it 6 and "resolve to see that it does not happen
again. '"" This danger is diminished when the prosecution uses
a conviction as impeachment evidence. It will be evident to the
trier that the witness has already been punished for the underlying
252. United States v. Kenney, 598 F. Supp. 883, 887 (D. Me. 1984); E. IMVnNELRIED,
UNCHARGED MtscoNDucr EVIDENCE § 2:08 (1984).
253. United States v. Huddleston, 485 U.S. 681, 689-90 (1988).
254. In Huddleston, the United States Supreme Court relied on the wording of Federal Rule
of Evidence 104(b). See id. at 689. The language of the California statutes make it even clearer that
the misdeeds comprising character evidence need only be proved by a sufficiency standard. CAL.
EviD. CODE § 403(a)(4) (West 1966). Section 403(a)(4) provides that the proponent need only
produce "evidence sufficient to sustain a fmding of the existence of the preliminary fact... when
the proffered evidence is of... conduct of a particular person and the preliminary fact is whether the
person... so conducted himself." Id. This language is strikingly similar to the language of Federal
Rule of Evidence 104(b). In fact, the Advisory Committee used the California rule as one of the
models for drafting Federal Rule 104. FED. R. EvD. 104 advisory committee's note.
California cases, however, are split on what standard a judge should apply to such evidence.
Compare People v. Simon, 184 Cal. App. 3d 125, 134, 228 Cal. Rptr. 855, 861 (1988)
(preponderance) with People v. Terry, 2 Cal. 3d 362, 369,466 P.2d 961,982-83, 85 Cal. Rptr. 409,
431 (1970) (clear and convincing).
255. United States v. Beechum, 582 F.2d 898, 914 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 920
(1979); Williams, The Problem of Similar Fact Evidence, 5 DALHousm L.J. 281, 289 (1979).
256. Sharpe, Two-Step Balancing and the Admissibility of Other Crimes Evidence: A Sliding
Scale of Proof, 59 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 556, 561 (1984).
257. Brown v. Commonwealth, 763 S.W.2d 128, 130 (Ky. 1989).
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act; consequently, the trier will be less tempted to punish the
witness nunc pro tunc.
The published opinions furnish perhaps the best indication of
how courts rate the seriousness of the constitutional attacks on
impeachment by convictions on the one hand, and on the use of
character evidence on the other. Although Castro advances the
proposition that admitting convictions lacking moral turpitude
offends due process, the majority could not cite any recent cases
supporting that proposition. In contrast, a number of courts have
found that admitting evidence of an accused's bad character is
constitutional error. 8 The constitutional danger Castro sought to
avoid in the use of convictions appears to be insignificant when
compared with the real dangers posed by evidence of bad character.
IV. CONCLUSION
When Professor M6ndez published California's New Law on
Character Evidence,"9 it seemed probable that the courts would
construe Proposition 8 literally. The probability had a legal as well
as a political basis. At the time, the textualist school of statutory
construction was gaining momentum, and the mandate from the
California electorate seemed clear.
Had Proposition 8 been given its plain as well as its intended
meaning, the character evidence ban would have been overturned,
and much power might have been shifted from the appellate courts
to the trial bench.260 That this has not occurred to date may say
much about the California Supreme Court's awareness of the need
to preserve general rules that protect the integrity of the fact
finding process.
The fact that the textualist approach was rejected in Castro and
Harris gives California courts an opportunity to revive the
258. E. IMWINKELRiED, UNCHAROED MISCONDUCT EVIDENCE §§ 10:12, 11:01, 11:10 (1984 &
Supp.).
259. Mndez, supra note 13.
260. See generally Graham, California's "Restatement" of Evidence: Some Reflections on
Appellate Repair of the Codification Fiasco, 4 Loy. LA.L. REV. 279 (1979); Mengler, The Theory
of Discretion in the Federal Rules of Evidence, 74 IowA L REV. 413 (1989).
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character evidence rules. Since the reasons for a non-textualist
approach in Castro and Harris apply with greater force in the case
of character evidence, consistency as well as the policy of
excluding evidence of doubtful relevance, unquestioned prejudice,




A discussion of the virtues and weaknesses of Proposition 8
must include at least some reflections on California's initiative
process. Initiatives were a turn of the century response to the
political clout of special interests. They provided the California
electorate with the means to circumvent an unresponsive legislature
held captive by powerful groups. Increasingly, the evidence today
suggests that this reform tool has now been taken over by special
interests and that changes may be necessary to preserve it as a
viable democratic tool. As one editorial recently lamented,
Initiatives have spawned an industry of highly paid political strategists,
lawyers, pollsters, fund-raisers and petition circulators. Using the latest
computer technology, they can qualify just about anything for the ballot
for a price. Some initiative mills offer a money-back guarantee if a
proposal does not gain enough signatures to qualify for the ballot.
262
It was not coincidental that the proponents of Proposition 8
entitled the initiative "The Victims' Bill of Rights" and the
provision barring the exclusion of relevant evidence "The Right to
Truth-in-Evidence." The proponents discovered early on that
characterizing initiatives as anti-crime measures enhanced the
likelihood of voter approval immeasurably. Indeed, not until the
fall of 1990 did the California electorate reject such a measure and
1046
261. The Epilogue reflects the views of only Professor Mindez.
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then most probably because of fiscal, not policy,
considerations.263
Among the problems posed by initiatives such as Proposition
8, two are especially troubling. One is the difficulty the voters
encounter in understanding the changes proposed by complex
initiatives on esoteric subjects. At the time Proposition 8 appeared
on the ballot, Professor M6ndez had taught evidence, including the
California Evidence Code sections governing character evidence,
for over four years. Nothing in the ballot statements or in the
political propaganda surrounding the initiative or in the initiative
itself gave him a hint of the enormous changes the proposition
could effect. Perhaps only its framers understood that the
proposition was intended to establish two systems of evidence, the
traditional one governing civil cases and a new one governing
criminal cases. Civil cases were to remain subject to the Evidence
Code as enacted by the legislature. On the other hand, criminal
cases would be governed by a highly abridged version of the
Evidence Code brought about by the Right to Truth-in-Evidence
provision.
The other troubling aspect is the lack of scrutiny accompanying
complex propositions. It is clear that the authors of Proposition 8
intended to effect changes in the admission of evidence that would
favor the prosecution. The playing field was to be recontoured in
a fashion that would allow the fact finder to learn about the
defendant's bad character. The key was the Right to Truth-in-
Evidence provision. But by removing the bar to admissibility of
relevant evidence, the authors unwittingly risked eliminating
statutory and judicial barriers to evidence unfavorable to
prosecutors. The authors had the foresight to exempt the rape shield
laws from the effect of the proposition, but their efforts fell short.
From a prosecutorial perspective, the Right to Truth-in-
Evidence provision had an especially unfortunate and unforeseen
impact on a law which was enacted only months before Proposition
8 and which was designed to place strict limits on the use of
263. Proposition 129, among othermatters, would have authorized the issuance of $740 million
of general revenue bonds to pay for drug abuse, conftmement, and treatment facilities.
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intoxication and diminished capacity in California criminal
cases.264 Reacting to the public outrage over the voluntary
manslaughter convictions of Dan White in the killings of San
Francisco Mayor George Moscone and Supervisor Harvey Milk, the
legislature restricted the scope of expert testimony in cases
involving mental impairments and banned the use of evidence of
intoxication and mental impairments to disprove the accused's
capacity to form the mens rea of specific intent offenses. 65 Since
such evidence is of particular relevance in any crime requiring a
mens rea, Proposition 8 called into question the validity of the new
law.
Ultimately, the new law was saved by the reenactment of the
statute.266 The reenactment had to be approved by two-thirds of
each house.267 Undoubtedly, the framers of Proposition 8 hardly
envisioned the application of the super majority requirement to an
anti-crime measure.
The legislative process, to be sure, does not always guarantee
a perfect statute. But it does provide the opportunity for the kind
of scrutiny designed to disclose the type of unanticipated
difficulties posed by such sweeping measures as Proposition 8. For
all -their faults, legislative hearings can generate the information
needed for a more complete analysis and an informed choice. The
legislative process can at times identify and eliminate the
uncertainties and ambiguities that can plague initiatives.
John Kaplan was right in predicting that it would take at least
ten years to determine the impact of Proposition 8 in California
criminal trials.268 Though at the time his prediction was shocking,
264. See CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 22, 28-29 (West 1988).
265. Ia
266. Penal Code section 22 was reenacted in 1982 after the passage of Proposition 8. See 1981
Cal. Stat. ch. 404, sec. 2, at 1592-93. Penal Code section 28 was reenacted in September 1982. See
1981 Cal. Stat. ch. 404, sec. 4, at 1592. Penal Code section 29 was reenacted in September 1984. See
1984 Cal. Stat. ch. 1433, sec. 3, at 5030.
267. To "protect" the Right to Truth-in-Evidence provision from legislative meddling, the
provision requires any statute that would exclude relevant evidence in any criminal proceeding to be
approved by a super majority. CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 28(d).
263. Taylor, Experts Differ in Assessing Impact of Gann Initiative, CAL. LAw., July-Aug. 1982,
at 46.
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in retrospect he may have underestimated the years and amount of
litigation needed to resolve the controversies spawned by the
initiative. One can only speculate when the courts will end the
indeterminacy loosened by the initiative. But it is worth pondering
whether the costs of that uncertainty would have been as high had
the initiative been subjected to legislative hearings.
A final point. Embedded in recent anti-crime measures,
including Proposition 8, is a dangerous artificial duality, a "we
versus them mentality" that is pointedly missing from the Bill of
Rights. Surely, criminals were no more loved at the adoption of the
Constitution than they are today. Yet, one cannot help but sense
that the Founding Fathers were thinldng about themselves, not just
muggers, rapists, and murderers, when contemplating the rights that
all accused should enjoy when threatened by the state and its
agents. The Founding Fathers understood the need to grant the state
a virtual monopoly on lawful violence, including the curtailment of
freedom and the imposition of death. In turn, the Founding Fathers
appreciated the need to place strict limits on that awesome power.
The Founding Fathers' sense that "we" too can be fair game
in the state's quest for order appears to have been lost. In the
uncertainties unleashed by the 1960's generational conflict, Richard
Nixon hit pay dirt on the campaign trail in 1968 with his "law and
order" theme. Politicians know a good thing when they see it.
They still play the theme. Regrettably, playing on people's fears
can impede the kind of discourse urgent problems require. In the
field of criminal law, a "we versus them" mentality not only can
obscure what needs to be done to make America safe again, but
can lead to some ill conceived measures that threaten hard-won
rights and liberties all of us should cherish.
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